



Do target shareholder agreements induce 




First draft: January 2009 
 
Abstract 
In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their 
relations. Such agreements are often viewed as means of insulating the firm from the market 
for corporate control. Specific provisions (namely concerted action, pre-emptive buying rights 
and repartitioning of board seats) are indeed likely to influence the outcome of takeovers. 
Using a sample of French deals, this paper investigates the impact of shareholder agreements 
on takeover premiums. A shareholder agreement is in force in 27.1% of target companies. A 
positive  relationship  between  shareholder  pacts  and  takeover  premiums  is  observed.  This 
result is robust to the use of an econometrical specification which treats as endogenous the 
existence  of  a  shareholder  agreement.  This  finding  suggests  that  shareholder  pacts 
dramatically increase the negotiating power of target shareholders.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
In  listed  companies,  some  shareholders  can  be  signatories  to  explicit  agreements  that 
govern their relations. These agreements  can contain a very large number of clauses that 
specify restrictions on the transfer of shares and/or organize an effective control over the firm. 
A recent report commissioned by the European Commission (ISS, Shearman and Sterling, and 
ECGI, 2007) documents the importance of this phenomenon: such an agreement is in force in 
nearly 12% of European listed companies. 
Beyond this evidence, some questions arise. What is the main motivation of shareholders 
entering into an agreement? According to Chemla et al. (2007), shareholder agreements are 
efficient coordination mechanisms. They provide the contracting parties with the incentives to 
make  ex-ante  optimal  investments  and  limit  ex-post  adverse  wealth  transfers.  Other 
predictions  have  been  developed.  Some  shareholders  could  be  interested  in  agreements 
because  they  maintain  a  lock  on  control.  In  Bennedsen  and  Wolfenzon  (2000),  coalition 
members share private benefits at the expense of non contracting shareholders. Following this 
reasoning,  one  could  postulate  that  such  agreements  are  aimed  at  protecting  entrenched 
insiders from takeovers. In this context, the emergence of an agreement is a negative event; 
Gianfrate (2007) demonstrates that the renewal or the signature of an agreement is associated 
with negative and significant abnormal returns. 
This paper investigates the relationship between shareholder agreements and the market 
for  corporate  control.  More  precisely,  the  focus  is  on  the  impact  of  such  agreements  on 
takeover premiums. The questions I address are the following: how does the existence of a 
shareholder agreement influence the bidding strategy? Do such agreements force the bidder to 
pay a higher price to gain control of the target? The purpose of this paper is to contribute to 
the vast literature which relates target returns to ownership structure by analyzing an explicit 
mechanism that has received little attention. 
My empirical analysis relies on a sample of 140 French takeovers occurring between 1999 
and 2007. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the existence of 
shareholder agreements in target firms. Such an agreement is in force in 27.1% of the targets. 
The prevalence of shareholder pacts among target firms is very similar to that reported by 
earlier studies which use classical samples of listed companies (Roosenboom and Schramade, 
2006; Boubaker, 2007).  
This paper also investigates the corporate governance of firms concerned by a shareholder 
agreement. There is no evidence of an illegitimate control insofar as the signatories to the 3 
 
agreement own board rights (as proxied by the percentage of board seats reserved to the 
members of the pact) that closely match their voting rights. This result does not validate the 
idea that shareholder agreements are entrenchment devices allowing their signatories to secure 
a disproportionate board representation (Gianfrate, 2007). 
I observe a positive and significant relationship between shareholder agreements and bid 
premiums. This finding suggests that shareholder pacts are means of extracting surplus from 
the bidder, this extraction being possible thanks to a better negotiating power. The effect of 
different provisions is also analyzed. The focus is on pre-emptive buying rights, repartitioning 
of board seats and concerted action. These clauses are likely to influence the outcome of a 
takeover  and  are  hence  expected  to  affect  bidding  behavior.  The  empirical  analysis 
demonstrates that these clauses are positively associated with takeover premiums. The results 
are  robust  to  the  use  of  a  two-step  Heckman  procedure  which  treats  the  existence  of  a 
shareholder agreement as an endogenous variable. 
Some papers (Volpin, 2002; Roosenboom and Schramade, 2006; Belot, 2008) notice a 
higher valuation for firms featuring a shareholder agreement. This paper could improve our 
understanding of this latter result: it could be that the higher anticipated takeover premium 
explains the positive effect of shareholder agreements on firm value. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  briefly  describes 
shareholder  agreements  and  the  French  institutional  framework.  In  the  third  section,  the 
literature analyzing the link between ownership structure and takeover premiums is reviewed. 
Section  4  presents  the  sample  and  the  methodology.  In  section  5,  empirical  results  and 
robustness checks are exposed. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Shareholder agreements: The French institutional framework 
 
I  simply  define  a  shareholder  agreement  as  an  arrangement  among  shareholders.  The 
purpose of these agreements is to take, retain and organize effective control over the firm. As 
the focus of this paper is on listed companies, it is worth mentioning that these pacts are extra-
statutory and only concern a small number of shareholders (the signatories to the agreement). 
In France, shareholder agreements must be disclosed to the AMF (Autorité des Marchés 
Financiers, the French equivalent to SEC) in the five days following their signature as soon as 
they  concern  at  least  0.5%  of  the  securities  or  voting  rights.  This  rule  allows  to  know 
precisely the contracting shareholders, their stakes and above all the agreement’s provisions. 
One could wonder whether all shareholder  agreements are disclosed to the AMF. To my 4 
 
knowledge, there are no failures to comply with this obligation; furthermore no anecdotal 
evidence tends to validate the idea that some agreements remain secret.  
In my analysis of shareholder agreements, I observe a very large number of clauses. Some 
clauses  are  very  widespread  and  classical
1  (for  instance  pre-emptive  buying  rights  under 
which  a  shareholder  wishing  to  sell  her  shares  is  required  to  offer  these  shares  to  other 
contracting shareholders) whereas other clauses are very specific and only encountered in a 
low number of listed companies. The imagination of lawyers is the only limit to the clauses of 
shareholder pacts, which is why some mechanisms are really firm specific.  
An important question arises from the signing of an agreement: can it be described as a 
concerted  action?  According  to  French  law,  an  “agreement  concluded  to  acquire  or  sell 
voting rights or to exercize these voting rights so as to implement a common policy towards 
the company” is characteristic of concerted action. The most important feature of a concerted 
action is the fact that contracting shareholders express a common will and vision about the 
firm’s strategic decisions.  
Depending on their clauses, some shareholder pacts will be described as concerted action 
and some others will not. For example, a shareholder agreement which only contains mutual 
pre-emptive buying rights will not necessarily be considered as a concerted action. If the same 
agreement also includes the obligation for the contracting parties to meet before the general 
meeting in order to decide on vote orientation, it will constitute a concerted action. 
In this paper, I will especially be interested in three particular provisions. The focus will 
be  on  agreements  that  characterize  a  concerted  action  (CONCERT),  on  agreements  that 
specify pre-emptive buying rights (PREEMPTION) and on agreements that prescribe ex-ante 
a certain repartitioning of board seats between contracting shareholders (BOARD). 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that shareholder agreements remain in force in the case of a 
takeover. Shareholder agreements are ordinary private contracts whose content is not limited 
by law. Consequently, a clause specifying that the agreement is no longer binding once a 
takeover  is  launched  on  the  company  could  be  written.  I  have  never  come  upon  such  a 
provision. 
 
3.  Background  
 
                                                           
1 For a detailed (but not exhaustive) list of shareholder agreements’ provisions, see Chemla et al. (2007) and 
Belot (2008). 5 
 
Many  theoretical  and  empirical  papers  have  analyzed  the  impact  of  target  ownership 
structure  on  shareholder  gains  during  takeovers.  Unfortunately,  we  lack  theoretical 
predictions  concerning  the  impact  of  shareholder  agreements.  The  magnitude  and  the 
direction of this impact will consequently appear as an open empirical issue. 
 
3.1  Ownership structure and takeover premium 
 
In Stulz (1988), higher ownership is associated with greater negotiating power. This latter 
provides  target  shareholders  with  the  ability  to  extract  higher  rents  from  the  bidder. 
Consequently,  a  positive  association  between  inside  ownership  and  takeover  premium  is 
expected.  
Through its impact on firm performance, inside ownership may be related to takeover 
premiums. Morck et al. (1988) document a negative entrenchment effect arising at certain 
levels of inside ownership, the impact being even more pronounced when the insider own 
voting rights in excess of cash flow rights (Bebchuk et al., 2000). This effect is detrimental to 
firm  performance  and  reduces  firm  valuation  (Claessens  et  al.,  2002).  Anticipating  the 
inefficiencies she will be able to reduce, the bidder may be prone to offer a high price when 
the ex-ante performance of the target is low.  
In  constrast,  a  positive  association  between  inside  ownership  and  ex-ante  firm 
performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) may induce bidders to offer lower premiums. A 
negative association between inside ownership and takeover premiums is then expected. Such 
a negative association may also results from an opportunistic behavior of insiders using their 
control to expropriate minority shareholders during the takeover process. Target insiders may 
indeed trade takeover premiums in return for private benefits as postulated by Moeller (2005). 
Many empirical papers have analyzed the impact of inside ownership on target returns. It 
is  worth  mentioning  that  in  the  vast  majority  of  the  papers  the  dependent  variable  is  a 
cumulative  abnormal  return  around  the  announcement  date  (and  seldom  the  takeover 
premium).  This  empirical  strategy  relies  on  the  intuition  that  high  takeover  premiums 
translate into positive abnormal returns. Stulz et al. (1990) and Song and Walkling (1993) 
document a positive relationship between abnormal returns and inside ownership for a sample 
of contested bids. Focusing on takeover premiums, Moeller (2005) notices a negative impact 
of CEO ownership what he interprets as an evidence of the CEO bargaining for personal 
compensation and side payments instead of bargaining for higher premiums from which all 
existing shareholders would benefit. To sum up, theoretical literature as well as empirical 6 
 
literature  provide  us  with  mixed  and  opposite  conclusions  concerning  the  sense  of  the 
relationship between insider ownership and takeover premium.  
 
3.2  Shareholder agreements and takeover premiums 
 
Shareholder agreements can be viewed as efficient coordination mechanisms (Chemla et 
al.,  2007).  This  might  explain  the  highest  valuation  of  firms  concerned  by  an  agreement 
(Volpin, 2002). If shareholder agreements generate efficiency, one could expect that a bidder 
will be less likely to offer a high price according to the above performance argument. 
Stulz  (1988)  provides  another  argument  predicting  a  positive  association  between 
shareholder agreements and takeover premiums. Shareholder agreements can be viewed as 
means  of  enhancing  the  bargaining  power  of  target  insiders.  This  prediction  may  be 
particularly  true  when  the  agreement  specifies  provisions  that  can  hamper  the  transfer  of 
control. Some shareholder agreements’ provisions may play this role.  
(1)  Concerted  action  requires  unanimity  among  the  contracting  shareholders.  No 
important decision can be made without the approval of each signatory. If such a unanimity 
cannot  be  reached,  some  shareholder  pacts  specify  provisions  that  will  help  resolve  the 
conflict (for instance through the nomination of a referee). This need for unanimity of course 
leads to bargaining problems among contracting shareholders. In Gomes and Novaes (2005), 
these  bargaining  problems  can  lead  the  firm  to  pass  up  bad  investment  projects.  This 
reasoning can be duplicated for mergers and acquisitions: the need for unanimity among the 
members of a coalition can lead the firm to pass up bad acquisition projects, in other words 
bids that are not valuable. 
(2) Pre-emptive buying rights appear as another way to extract rents from the bidder in 
form  of  higher  takeover  premium.  According  to  this  provision,  a  contracting  shareholder 
wishing to tender her shares to the bidder is required to offer it to the other contracting parties. 
Suppose that shareholder X agrees with the terms of the offer but that shareholder Y considers 
the offer as underpriced. Shareholder Y is granted a priority buying right over the shares to be 
tendered by shareholder X. By exercizing this right, shareholder Y can strengthen her control 
over the firm and prevent the takeover. Being aware of this credible threat, the bidder may be 
forced  to  pay  a  higher  premium.  It  is  worth  noting  that  this  threat  is  only  credible  if 
shareholder Y is wealthy enough to buy the stake of shareholder X. This point is of particular 
importance for the empirical study, but it is unfortunately impossible to know if Y is a deep 
pocket shareholder. 7 
 
(3) An allocation of board seats can be prescribed by the shareholder agreement. Under 
such a provision, contracting shareholders agree to favor their election as members of the 
board of directors. The agreement can specify that shareholder X will be granted two seats 
whereas one seat will be reserved to shareholder Y. In the case of a takeover, the target’s 
board of directors has to evaluate the quality of the bid. If it leads to an over-representation of 
the signatories (Gianfrate, 2007), a clause prescribing an allocation of board seats is another 
mechanism that enhances the bargaining power of the contracting shareholders. This clause is 
hence likely to force a bidder to pay a significant premium if she wants to attract the approval 
of the board. 
Following these arguments, a positive association between shareholder agreements and 
takeover premium is expected. However, this positive analysis of shareholder agreements is 
possibly incorrect. Suppose that the agreement is a means of enhancing the bargaining power 
of the coalition members and that these latter only use it in their own interest (for instance 
they can privately negotiate side payments with the bidder or the guarantee of an important 
position  in  the  bidder’s  management  committee).  Having  obtained  these  side  payments, 
contracting shareholders may no longer be concerned and interested in a high premium from 
which  all  existing  shareholders  would  however  benefit.  This  argument  is  developed  by 
Moeller (2005).  
Trying  to  disentangle  the  positive  and  negative  effects  of  shareholder  agreements  on 
takeover premium is hence an empirical issue, and I will try to address it in the following 
sections. 
 
4.  Sample, variables and methodology 
 
4.1  Sample 
 
I extract my acquisition sample from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) mergers 
and  acquisitions  database.  To  be  included  in  the  sample,  a  transaction  must  satisfy  the 
following criteria: 
-  The target is a French listed company. 
-  The announcement date is between August 30, 1999 and December 31, 2007. 
-  The acquisition is completed. 
-  The deal value reported in SDC is greater than 20 million Euros. 8 
 
-  The percent of shares held by the acquirer 6 months prior to the announcement is lower 
than  50%;  the  percent  of  shares  she  owns  after  the  transaction  is  greater  than  50%. 
Consequently, I only focus on transactions that imply a change of control. 
-  The bidder acquires at least 15% of the target shares in the transaction. 
 
This initial screening gives 194 observations. When the ownership structure of the target 
is not available (due to the impossibility of finding the filing that describes the transaction 
and/or the target’s annual report), the transaction is excluded. This reduces the sample to 169 
observations. Acquisitions are also excluded when financial market data are not available in 
DATASTREAM and/or accounting data are not reported in WORLDSCOPE. This reduces 
the sample to 162 observations. 
 
4.2  Variables 
 
4.2.1  Dependent variable 
 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  address  a  specific  question:  how  does  a  shareholder 
agreement  influence  the  bidding  behavior  of  a  potential  acquirer?  The  most  important 
component of the bidding strategy is the price that is proposed to existing shareholders. One 
could postulate that a shareholder agreement is a mechanism that is viewed as a credible 
threat  by  the  bidder.  This  could  in  return  enhance  the  bargaining  power  of  the  target 
shareholders and force the bidder to offer a higher price. 
The  dependent  variable  of  the  empirical  analysis  is  the  control  premium  which  is 
calculated as the ratio of the difference between the offer price and the stock price one month 
prior to the announcement date to this same stock price. 
Premium =
Offer price
Stock price one month before the announcement date
− 1 
When I observe a stock offer, I determine the offer price by multiplying the number of bidder 
shares offered per target share by the bidder’s closing price on the announcement date.  
This is a standard measure in the financial literature (Bange and Mazzeo, 2004; Officer, 
2003; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Moeller, 2005; Anderson and Dyl, 2004). Some studies (e.g. 
Rossi and Volpin, 2004) rely on the value that is provided by the SDC database. The SDC 
database  provides  a  measure  of  the  preceding  ratio  but  it  is  often  incomplete  and  many 
problems arise (for a discussion of this issue, see Officer (2003)). I do not use the information 9 
 
provided by SDC but obtain the offer price through the filings
2 which describe the acquisition 
whereas the stock price is taken from DATASTREAM. Following Officer (2003), I exclude 
the acquisitions which exhibit a negative premium.
3 This reduces the sample to 140 deals. 
 
4.2.2  Deal characteristics 
 
I control for deal characteristics that are likely to be correlated with takeover premiums.  
-  The dummy variable SAME INDUS takes the value of one when the target and the bidder 
have the same 2-digits SIC code (source: SDC) and zero otherwise. If the bidder and the 
target are drawn from the same industry, operational synergies arising from economies of 
scales are likely to emerge. The bidder may be eager to offer a higher premium when such 
synergies are expected (Sudarsanam et al., 1996). 
-  The dummy variable TENDER (source: SDC) indicates if the bid takes the form of a 
tender offer. Huang and Walkling (1987) find that tender offers yield significantly higher 
returns. 
-  I control for the existence of a toehold (TOEHOLD) which is defined as the percentage of 
target shares owned by the bidder before the acquisition. This data is obtained manually. 
Betton and Eckbo (2000) show that the takeover premium is negatively impacted by the 
bidder’s toehold. 
-  The  dummy  variable  PRIVATE  takes  the  value  of  one  when  the  bidder  is  a  private 
company.  This  variable  is  important  because  Bargeron  et  al.  (2008)  demonstrate  that 
private acquirers offer premiums that are lower than those offered by public bidders. 
 
4.2.3  Control variables 
 
I take into account three financial indicators of target size, leverage and valuation. 
-  Market capitalization (MARKET CAP) is defined as the target market value of equity one 
month before the takeover announcement.  
-  Market to book (M to B) is calculated as the sum of market value of equity (one month 
before  the  announcement)  and  financial  debts  (proxied  by  its  book  value)  over  total 
assets.  Bauguess  et  al.  (2008)  demonstrate  a  positive  association  between  takeover 
                                                           
2 These filings are available through the AMF website, www.amf-france.org. 
3 Officer (2003) also excludes acquisitions featuring a very high premium (an arbitrary bound of 2 is chosen). 
This is not relevant in this paper because the highest premium is equal to 187%. 10 
 
premium and book to market (hence a negative association between market to book and 
takeover premium).  
-  Leverage (LEVERAGE) is the ratio of financial debt over total assets.
4 On one hand, a 
higher leverage could result in a better monitoring of the management, which makes the 
payment of a high premium less likely. One the other hand, Stulz (1988, p.43) postulates 
that “an increase in leverage consolidates voting rights in the hands of management and 
hence  enables  it  to  force  a  bidder  to  pay  a  higher  premium  to  acquire  control”. 
Consequently,  the  sense  of  the  relationship  between  target  leverage  and  takeover 
premium is not really clear. 
 
4.2.4  Ownership variables 
 
For each target, I manually collect ownership data from firms’ annual reports for the end 
of  the  year  preceding  the  deal.  Although  this  manual  collection  is  a  slow  process,  it  is 
necessary to the extent that the commercial databases do not provide accurate information. 
For  instance,  the  ownership  component  of  THOMSON  ONE  BANKER  only  supplies 
percentages of capital which can strongly differ from percentages of voting rights. In France, 
the charter of the firm can indeed authorize double voting rights for registered shares that 
have been held for a defined number of years (between 2 and 4 years).  
I also manually collect data about shareholder agreements. These are easily accessible 
through a dedicated section in the annual report but also through designated pages on the 
AMF website. These filings always contain the signature date, the identity of contracting 
shareholders and the content of the agreement. 
Following  previous  studies  (starting  with  La  Porta  et  al.,  1999),  I  use  the  ultimate 
ownership methodology (at the 20% threshold) in order to capture the discrepancy between 
control rights and cash-flow rights. This is of special importance to the extent that pyramidal 
structures  and  double  voting  rights  are  very  widespread  in  France  (Boubaker,  2007).  My 
methodology slightly differs from those adopted by Faccio and Lang (2002). The following 
example illustrates this point: consider a company (firm X) whose main shareholder is the 
firm Y with 17% of cash-flow and voting rights. If the main shareholder of Y is the family F 
with 18% of cash-flow and voting rights, I will say that at the 20% threshold the ultimate 
                                                           
4 Accounting numbers (for financial debts and total assets) are extracted from WORLDSCOPE for the fiscal year 
prior to the deal announcement. 11 
 
owner of firm X is the widely held firm Y with 17% of cash-flow and voting rights.
5 SH1 
CFR denotes the ultimate cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder; SH1 VR denotes her 
ultimate  voting  rights.  If  some  shareholders  are  signatories  to  an  agreement,  SHAG  VR 
denotes the ultimate voting rights of the coalition (the sum of the individual voting rights). 
The concerted action provision materializes the existence of a strong shareholders’ coalition, I 
hence calculate CONCERT VR which denotes the ultimate voting rights of the signatories to 
a concerted action. As an illustration, Appendix A describes the ownership structure of SELF 
TRADE and the value of each ownership variable. 
To capture any entrenchment effect induced by a high wedge between voting and cash-
flow rights, I include the variable SH1 EXCESS which is computed as SH1 VR / SH1 DCF 
(Villalonga  and  Amit,  2007).  If  we  assume  that  the  target’s  largest  shareholder  tends  to 
collude with the bidder during the takeover (Moeller, 2005), a negative relationship between 
takeover premium and excess of control is expected. 
Suppose that the first shareholder is the leader of the coalition and that other contracting 
shareholders always agree with her. In such a case, one can postulate that the first shareholder 
exercizes not only her own voting rights but also those owned by other signatories. In such a 
case, the shareholder agreement provides the first shareholder with an illegitimate excess of 
control (SH1 EC AGREEMENT) which is calculated as the ratio SH1 AG /  SH1 VR. I also 
calculate the excessive control provided by a concerted action provision as SH1 CONCERT / 
SH1 VR (SH1 EC CONCERT). 
 
4.2.5  Board composition 
 
The board of directors plays a crucial role in the takeover process because it is supposed 
to give an opinion about the bid (approve or reject it). For a sample of Italian firms, Gianfrate 
(2007) demonstrates that the board of directors is highly dominated by the members of the 
coalition when a shareholder agreement is in force. Furthermore, he notices that the coalition 
owns board rights that strongly exceed its control rights. It seems interesting to explore this 
issue for a sample of target firms and to compare the results to those obtained with a classical 
sample of listed firms. 
The task of matching an ownership structure with a board structure is not always obvious. 
It  is  straightforward  when  the  largest  shareholder  is  a  family.  For  instance,  the  board  of 
                                                           
5 In Faccio and Lang’s (2002) analysis, firm X would be considered as a widely held firm at the 20% threshold.   12 
 
MARIONNAUD is composed of 4 directors who all have the same last name (FRYDMAN). 
The ultimate owner of MARIONNAUD is the FRYDMAN family with 19.8% of the cash-
flow rights and 32.3% of the voting rights. This high wedge between voting and cash-flow 
rights is due to the existence of double voting rights. The FRYDMAN family owns 100% of 
board rights and only 19.8% of cash-flow rights. Due to marriages, however, some directors 
can  be  members  of  the  same  family  but  have  different  last  names.  For  instance,  C.  De 
MARGERIE is a member of the TAITTINGER family who is the ultimate owner of the listed 
company TAITTINGER. 
The situation is even more complicated when the shareholder is a (listed) company. The 
example of SELF TRADE (Appendix A) illustrates this point. The largest shareholder is SEB, 
and  SEB’s  CEO  (L.  THUNELL)  serves  as  director  of  SELF  TRADE.  A  shareholder 
agreement is in force and specifies that two seats of SELF TRADE’s board of directors will 
be  allocated  to  SEB.  An  important  question  arises:  how  to  identify  the  other  director 
appointed by SEB? I consider that G. BREGUET is likely to be the second director, because 
he was appointed in October 1998 (when SEB became a shareholder of SELF TRADE) and 
was between 1982 and 1993 the chairman of ABB and ASEA, other companies controlled by 
SEB’s ultimate owner (the WALLENBERG family). 
SH1%BOARD  denotes  the  percentage  of  seats  controlled  by  the  largest  shareholder, 
SHAG%BOARD is the percentage of seats owned by the signatories to the agreement. In the 
SELF TRADE example, SH1%BOARD=2/9=22.22% and SHAG%BOARD=7/9=77.78%. 
Due  to  the  difficulty  of  accurately  matching  directors  and  owners,  it  is  unfortunately 
possible to consider some directors as unaffiliated whereas they are in fact affiliated to one 
shareholder. In other words, the analysis is likely to underestimate the actual control over the 
board of directors. Due to missing data, the analysis of board of directors relies on a sample 
of 135 firms. 
 
5.  Empirical results 
 
5.1  Descriptive statistics 
 
Table  1  reports  the  annual  number  and  the  value  of  the  deals;  it  also  describes  the 
prevalence  of  shareholder  agreements  in  target  firms.  The  average  (median)  market 
capitalization one month before the announcement is 1,263.7 (200.6) million Euros. These 
figures are higher than those observed by Bange and Mazzeo (2004). 38 targets (27.1% of the 13 
 
sample) have a shareholder agreement. I am not aware of any study describing the prevalence 
of shareholder agreements in target firms, nevertheless previous literature gives us insights 
about the use of such agreements in listed companies. Boubaker (2007) documents that an 
agreement is in force in one third of French listed firms; Roosenboom and Schramade (2006) 
notice  that  over  the  period  1993-1999  26.4%  of  French  IPOs  featured  a  shareholder 
agreement. It hence appears that the prevalence of shareholder agreements among target firms 
is  very  similar  to  that  observed  for  a  sample  of  listed  firms  (which  are  not  targets  of  a 
takeover bid). Although the purpose of this paper is not to shed some light on the relationship 
between shareholder agreements and the likelihood of a takeover bid, the nearly identical 
distribution  of  shareholder  agreements  in  target  and  listed  firms  tends  to  show  that 
shareholder pacts do not prevent takeover bids. This point deserves a more accurate empirical 
analysis; however firms having a shareholder agreement do not appear as offering higher 
resistance to takeover bids. This result is in line with Ambrose and Megginson (1992) who do 
not find any significant relationship between ownership structure and acquisition likelihood. 
 
[ Insert table 1 here ] 
 
In table 2, I split the sample according to the existence of a shareholder agreement. This 
table  describes  the  ownership  patterns  of  the  targets,  some  financial  indicators  and  the 
characteristics  of  the  deal.  This  table  presents  the  differences  between  targets  that  are 
concerned by an agreement and targets that are not. The last columns of this table test for the 
significance of the difference in means.
6 
It appears that the ownership structures of firms concerned by an agreement are very 
specific.  In  the  vast  majority  of  the  cases,  there  are  at  least  two  large  blockholders
7 
(COMPLEX=78.9%  on  average).  Complex  ownership  structures  represent  48.6%  of  the 
sample; this figure is higher than that reported by Laeven and Levine (2008) or Belot (2008). 
Not surprisingly, the first shareholder is less powerful in targets concerned by an agreement 
(ultimate voting rights of 37.4% against 47.3%). The shareholder agreement appears useful in 
that it can help the largest shareholder to consolidate her power. 
                                                           
6  The  table  does  not  report  the  Wilcoxon  z-statistics  (for  the  difference  in  medians)  to  the  extent  that  the 
conclusions are exactly similar. These results are available upon request. 
7 These ownership structures are defined as “Complex Ownership Structures” by Laeven and Levine (2008). 
Such ownership structures exhibit at least two large shareholders, each of them owning at least 10% of the voting 
rights. 14 
 
On average, the takeover premium is equal to 27.4%. It is higher for the sample of firms 
having an agreement but the difference is not statistically significant (p-value of 18.9%). 
Previous studies report higher takeover premiums (30.8%, Moeller (2005); 32.8%, Bange and 
Mazzeo (2004)). The vast majority of the deals are exclusively paid with cash, which is a 
characteristic of European deals (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). This statistic is not surprising to 
the extent that 56.4% of the bidders are private firms which by definition are not able to offer 
stocks. It appears that firms whose shareholders are signatories to an agreement are less likely 
to receive a pure cash offer. Concerning the relatedness of the activities of the acquiring and 
target  firms,  I  notice  that  62.9%  (=1-37.1%)  of  the  acquisitions  can  be  considered  as 
diversifications. This figure is higher than that reported by Officer (2003) for a sample of US 
firms. Toeholds are higher for target firms concerned by an agreement; this tends to show that 
the bidder is frequently a signatory to a shareholder agreement. Lastly, hostile and contested 
deals are relatively rare events: this is in line with Moeller (2005) who documents a really 
low prevalence of such deals in his sample of US acquisitions.  
 
[ Insert table 2 here ] 
 
There is no significant difference in the financial and accounting indicators. Nevertheless, 
the size (proxied by the market value of equity) of firms concerned by an agreement is higher. 
Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985), one can easily explain this phenomenon: the larger is 
the firm, the higher is the wealth needed to control it. It becomes more and more difficult to 
control solely a firm as its value increases; alliances with other shareholders (in order to 
consolidate control) are hence more likely to occur.  
 
5.2  Shareholder agreements: provisions, voting rights and board composition 
 
Table 3 describes the agreements’ provisions and the voting rights of the signatories. I 
first split the sample according to the type of the largest signatory (Panel A); the sample is 
then  divided  according  to  the  existence  of  a  concerted  action  provision  (Panel  B)  and 
according to the existence of a clause which specifies ex-ante an allocation of board seats 
(Panel C). 
73.7% of the agreements contain pre-emptive buying rights, 60.5% of the shareholder 
pacts characterize a concerted action and an allocation of board seats is specified in 36.8% of 15 
 
the sample. The prevalence of concerted action and board representation provisions is higher 
than that reported by Roosenboom (2005) for a sample of French IPOs. This comparison 
suggests that the design of shareholder agreements evolves along the company’s life cycle. 
Family agreements
8 are more likely to characterize a concerted action and their control over 
the  firm  (measured  by  the  sum  of  the  signatories’  voting  rights)  is  significantly  higher. 
Furthermore, a member of the coalition is more likely to participate in the management. One 
possible interpretation is that families are more risk-averse and are prone to secure a strong 
control over the company which lead them to form coalitions with strong allies. Interestingly, 
the  number  of  signatories  is  significantly  higher  for  agreements  that  do  not  contain  a 
concerted action provision. This latter clause requires unanimity among signatories. When 
the number of coalition members is high, the shareholders are maybe reluctant to sign a 
concerted action provision because they anticipate the future difficulty of reaching unanimity.  
Using a sample of Italian firms whose shareholders are kept together by a voting trust 
agreement, Gianfrate (2007) analyzes the composition of the board of directors. He notices 
that a voting trust owning 52% of the company’s cash-flow rights is able to exercize up to 
87% of the total board rights. Thanks to the voting trust, the largest shareholder is able to 
gain full control over the firm (through a majority of seats at the board of directors) despite a 
low  fraction  of  cash-flow  rights  (28%  on  average).  The  conclusion  is  that  voting  trust 
agreements are used as entrenchment devices whose purpose is to insulate the firms from the 
takeover  market  and  secure  private  benefits.  Table  3  replicates  Gianfrate’s  analysis:  on 
average, the members of the agreements exercize 55.5% of board rights while owning 46.1% 
(58.5%) of the cash-flow rights (voting rights). The pact’s largest shareholder only owns 
27.8% of cash-flow rights. It appears that the members of the coalition are slightly over-
represented at the board of directors because they exercize board rights that are higher than 
their  cash-flow  rights.  The  very  high  wedge  between  board  rights  and  cash-flow  rights 
highlighted by Gianfrate (2007) does not seem to exist in the sample of French target firms. 
The signatories to the pact have a number of seats that matches their voting rights. This is 
also true for the firms whose shareholder are kept together by a concerted action. Strikingly, 
the composition of the board of directors does not seem to differ when an allocation of board 
seats is prescribed by the shareholder agreement. To sum up, these results are not consistent 
with the intuition that shareholder agreements are entrenchment devices. Indeed, shareholder 
agreements do not seem to be associated with disproportional board representation. 
                                                           
8 “Family agreement” refers to agreements whose largest signatory is a family. 16 
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It  is  nevertheless  possible  to  argue  that  the  sample  is  very  specific  insofar  as  it  is 
composed of target firms. It would be interesting to compare this sample to a sample of non-
target listed companies. In such companies, shareholder agreements’ signatories are maybe 
more entrenched which makes a takeover less likely. In other words, my sample possibly 
contains the “weakest” agreements (this is a selection bias) and this could explain why the 
firm becomes a target.  
This analysis suffers one weakness: there is no comparison with a sample of firms that are 
not concerned by an agreement. Such an analysis requires one assumption: I will hypothesize 
that firms whose ownership structure does not exhibit a shareholder agreement are solely 
controlled by the largest shareholder. The sample will be made of firms that have at least one 
large shareholder
9, I hence exclude three widely held firms that are not concerned by an 
agreement.  
In table 4, the sample is divided according to the existence of an agreement. The first 
subsample contains 96 firms that are not concerned by an agreement whereas the second 
subsample contains 36 firms whose shareholders are kept together by an agreement. In the 
first subsample, the decisions are assumed to be made by the largest shareholder. I compare 
the  power  of  the  coalition  (for  firms  having  an  agreement)  to  the  power  of  the  largest 
shareholder (for firms that are not controlled by an agreement and are hence considered as 
solely controlled by their largest owner).  
 
[ Insert table 4 here ] 
 
It  appears  that  the  board  of  directors  is  larger  and  that  the  controlling  shareholders 
participate more in the management when a shareholder agreement is in force. If the focus is 
on the discrepancy between board rights and control (or voting rights), the table shows that 
allied shareholders are not more over-represented than single owners at the board of directors. 
It is worth noticing that the discrepancy between cash-flow rights and voting rights is very 
large for the first subsample (with a mean of 1.791). This is due to the mechanism of voting 
rights that is very widespread in French listed companies and to the existence of pyramids 
                                                           
9 That is to say a shareholder owning at least 10% of the voting rights. 17 
 
(Ginglinger and Hamon, 2007). The figure (1.331) is lower for firms having an agreement. 
This suggests that shareholder agreements are possibly substitutes for pyramids and other 
control-enhancing mechanisms. When she is not able to secure an effective control over the 
firm through pyramids, multiple voting rights or cross-holdings, a shareholder is maybe prone 
to  enter  into  agreements  with  other  owners.  In  this  context,  the  device  used  to  ensure  a 
stability of control may change over time as postulated by Bianchi and Bianco (2006) who 
demonstrate that Italian firms experienced a switch from pyramids to shareholders’ coalitions 
in the past 15 years.  
 
5.3  Multivariate analysis 
 
In table 5, the link between shareholder agreements, ownership structures and takeover 
premiums is investigated. In regression (1), I only include a dummy variable which takes a 
value  of  one  if  a  shareholder  agreement  (whatever  its  provisions)  is  in  force  and  zero 
otherwise.  From  our  control  variables,  only  size  (proxied  by  the  market  capitalization), 
market to book value and sector relatedness significantly impact the takeover premium. In 
line with Officer (2003), it appears that premiums are significantly higher when the target has 
a small market capitalization, the target has a low market to book and the transaction is a 
intra-industry deal. This first regression tends to show that the presence of a shareholder 
agreement  positively  (and  significantly)  affects  the  takeover  premium.  One  possible 
interpretation is that the shareholder agreement provides the signatories with more bargaining 
power which forces the bidder to offer a higher price. 
In  regressions  (2)  and  (3),  I  control  for  the  ultimate  cash-flow  rights  of  the  first 
shareholder. Regression (3) includes a dummy variable (SH1 SIGNATORY) which takes a 
value  of  one  whether  the  first  shareholder  is  signatory  to  an  agreement.  Contrary  to  the 
previous  studies  which  document  significant  associations  between  insider  ownership  and 
premiums (Moeller, 2005; Bauguess et al., 2008), I do not find any significant relationship 
between the stake of the first shareholder and the premium. Premiums are higher when the 
first shareholder is signatory to a shareholder pact. The difference between regressions (2) 
and  (3)  is  the  following:  in  regression  (2)  the  dummy  AGREEMENT  captures  all  the 
agreements (in particular agreements whose signatories are small – i.e. do not own at least 
10% of the voting rights) whereas in regression (3) the dummy SH1 SIGNATORY captures 
only the coalitions whose largest shareholder own at least 10% of the voting rights. It hence 18 
 
appears that the agreements concerning at least one large shareholder have the most important 
economical significance. 
In  regression  (4),  the  discrepancy  between  voting  and  cash-flow  rights  is  included to 
control  for  any  entrenchment  effect.  The  excess  control  negatively  affects  the  takeover 
premiums. This could be interpreted as an evidence of expropriation by the largest owner: 
when she has wrong incentives, she could negotiate and extract private payments from the 
bidder  instead  of  a  high  price  (Moeller,  2005).  The  positive  “agreement  effect”  however 
remains. 
In  regressions  (5)  and  (6),  I  take  into  account  the  additional  control  provided  by 
shareholder  agreements.  The  variable  is  computed  with  the  assumption  that  the  first 
shareholder  solely  exercizes  the  voting  rights  of  all  the  signatories.  This  assumption  is 
certainly more relevant when the shareholder agreement characterizes a concerted action; 
consequently regression (6) only includes the excess voting rights provided by a concerted 
action provision. This is very similar to Villalonga and Amit’s (2007) analysis which focuses 
on voting trust.
10 Almost not significant (p-value of 13.8%), the coefficient of the variable 
SH1 EC AGREEMENT tends to show that the voting rights that are accumulated through the 
agreement  positively  impact  the  takeover  premium.  By  signing  an  agreement,  the  largest 
shareholder is able to consolidate her control over the firm; this increases her bargaining 
power and makes more likely the extraction of a high premium. This result could also be 
interpreted in light of the Bennedsen and Wolfenzon’s (2000) model: the accumulation of 
cash-flow rights by the controlling coalition makes it more likely to internalize the cost of its 
actions.  A  positive  alignment  effect  dominates  a  negative  coalition  formation  effect.  The 
result  is  less  convincing  for  voting  rights  that  are  accumulated  via  a  concerted  action 
(regression (6)).  
 
[ Insert table 5 here ] 
 
In table 6, light is shed on the impact of specific agreement provisions. In regressions (1) 
to  (3),  dummy  variables  are  included.  I  test  for  the  impact  of  pre-emptive  buying  rights 
(PREEMPTION),  concerted  action  (CONCERT)  and  provisions  that  specify  ex-ante  an 
allocation of board seats (BOARD). As described in section 3, these provisions are supposed 
to play a crucial role in the takeover process insofar as they are likely to strongly influence 
                                                           
10 A voting trust is a special agreement by which a shareholder transfer her voting rights to another shareholder. 19 
 
the outcome of the takeover. For the sake of brevity, the regressions including the stake of the 
largest  shareholder  are  not  reported  (the  inclusion  of  this  variable  does  not  change  the 
results
11). Whereas pre-emptive buying rights and repartitioning of board seats significantly 
affect takeover premiums, it appears that the  effect of concerted  action provisions is not 
significant. This result appears counterintuitive to the extent that concerted action seems to be 
the most binding provision. I will try to address more accurately this puzzling result in the 
following section dedicated to endogeneity. 
In  regressions  (4)  and  (5),  the  impact  of  different  characteristics  of  the  shareholder 
agreement is investigated. Regression (4) includes a dummy variable (AG MGT) which takes 
a value of one if a member of the coalition is also a member of the management team. This 
regression shows that the positive impact of shareholder agreements is especially strong when 
coalition members participate in the firm’s management. Such owner-managers could benefit 
from their power and trade takeover premiums for private benefits, such as the guarantee to 
receive  executive  positions  in  the  merged  firms  (Moeller,  2005).  The  results  are  not 
consistent with this story.  
Regression (5) includes a dummy variable (FAMILY) that indicates whether the largest 
shareholder of the coalition is a family. According to Maury and Pajuste (2005), families are 
eager to collude in order to expropriate minority shareholders. This does not seem to be true 
here: family agreements are associated with higher takeover premiums.  
 
[ Insert table 6 here ] 
 
5.4  Robustness: endogeneity issue 
 
In the preceding empirical analysis, the shareholder agreement dummy is an exogenous 
variable.  Demsetz  and  Lehn  (1985)  argue  that  firm  and  industry  characteristics  notably 
influence  the  structure  of  corporate  ownership.  In  this  section,  I  try  to  take  into  account 
variables that could explain the emergence of a shareholder agreement. In Gomes and Novaes 
(2005), an entrepreneur is likely to attract a large investor who will finance an investment. 
This large investor has to make an important decision: either she chooses to monitor the 
entrepreneur without participating in the management, or she decides to share control with the 
entrepreneur  over  the  investment  decision.  In  my  opinion,  the  existence  of  an  agreement 
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between  large  shareholders  clearly  characterizes  such  sharing  of  control.  One  of  the 
conclusions  is  that  shared  control  is  more  likely  to  emerge  in  firms  whose  investment 
opportunities  are  hard  for  outsiders  to  evaluate.  To  take  into  account  the  difficulty  of 
evaluating  investment  opportunities,  I  use  variables  that  are  often  viewed  as  proxies  for 
information  asymmetry  and  environment  instability:  the  volatility  (VOLATILITY)  of 
company returns (for the year preceding the takeover) and R&D expenditures (scaled by total 
assets) reported on WORLDSCOPE (R&D/ASSETS). 
It is often argued that a shareholder agreement is a means of insulating the company from 
the  market  for  corporate  control  (Gianfrate,  2007).  One  could  therefore  expect  that  this 
protection  is  more  relevant  when  corporate  takeovers  within  the  firm’s  industry  are  very 
frequent.  To  control  for  this  takeover  activity,  I  compute  the  measure  developed  by 
Schlingemann et al. (2002) (TA_LIQUIDITY) which is defined as the liquidity index of the 
market  for  corporate  control  for  the  target’s  industry.  It  is  calculated  as  the  value  of  all 
corporate transactions for $1 million or more reported  by SDC for the year preceding the 
takeover and two-digit SIC code divided by the total book value of assets of firms in the same 
two-digit SIC code for that year.
12  It can be hypothesized that shareholder agreements are 
more likely to emerge when TA_LIQUIDITY is high.  
I  correct  for  endogeneity  using  treatment  effect  regressions  for  my  indicators  of 
shareholder agreement. I use the treatreg (Heckman two-step option) subroutine of the Stata 
package (version 10 IC). In the first stage which takes the form of a probit regression,  I 
regress the dummy AGREEMENT (or dummies which takes of a value of one whether certain 
provisions  are  in  force)  against  a  set  of  independent  variables  in  order  to  generate  an 
instrument. The latter is then included in a regression with takeover premium as dependent 
variable. Such a procedure is used by Miller et al. (2007) who treat as endogenous a dummy 
variable which indicates family control. Due to missing data, the sample is now reduced to 
129 observations. 
In table 7, the  emergence of a shareholder  agreement (regression (1)), of a concerted 
action (regression (2)) and of a clause that specifies a repartitioning of board seats (regression 
(3)) is treated as an endogenous process. In the first step, the above variables are included. I 
also include the market to book, the leverage, and the market capitalization of the target.  
                                                           
12 The book value of assets is collected from the THOMSON ONE BANKER database. 21 
 
Variables related to the characteristics of the deal are not included.
13 One could argue that 
shareholder agreements not only emerge in response to a specific environment but also in 
response to a specific ownership structure. If the largest shareholder considers that she is not 
strong enough to secure control over the firm, she may be prone to find a partner. I control for 
this  issue  in  regression  (4)  by  including  in  the  first  step  the  Herfindahl  index 
(HERFINDAHL) computed as the sum of the squared cash-flow rights of each shareholder 
owning at least 5% of the cash-flow rights (i.e. the minimum disclosure threshold in France). 
Gomes and Novaes (2005) also argue that shared control is more likely to emerge when the 
information asymmetry between shareholders is low. This situation arises when shareholders 
have common background, which will be especially true when they  are families.  I hence 
include a dummy variable (FAMILY) which is equal to one if the largest shareholder of the 
target is a family. 
Regression  (1)  does  not  suggest  that  shareholder  agreements  significantly  impact  the 
takeover premium; however the coefficient is very close to significance with a p-value of 
0.11. The only significant predictor in the first step regression is the size of the target (proxied 
by its market value of  equity). This is in line with the predictions of Demsetz and  Lehn 
(1985).  Contrary  to  the  results  obtained  with  a  standard  OLS  regression,  regression  (2) 
demonstrates a positive relationship between concerted action and takeover premiums. The 
takeover  activity  within  the  firm’s  industry  positively  impacts  the  likelihood  of  having  a 
concerted action. This tends to show that the coalition members are willing to insulate the 
firms from the takeover market. The significance of the selection parameter λ indicates the 
presence of endogeneity in the original model. Concerted action appears as the most binding 
commitment of shareholder agreements; this is why a significant impact of this provision is 
expected.  By  using  a  standard  OLS  regression  (see  above),  I  do  not  find  any  strong 
relationship.  The  use  of  a  more  powerful  econometrical  specification  suggests  another 
conclusion.  An  unreported  regression  (available  upon  request)  confirms  that  pre-emptive 
buying  rights  significantly  affect  the  takeover  premium.  The  conclusion  concerning  the 
BOARD provision is not robust to the use of a two-step procedure (regression (3)). Lastly, I 
take into account the target ownership structure (regression (4)). This increases the overall 
significance of the model; the positive impact of a concerted action remains. 
 
                                                           
13 There is no reason to include the characteristics of the deals as predictors of the existence of a shareholder 
agreement insofar as the agreement is in force ex-ante. The characteristics of the deal are possibly influenced by 
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The validity of these results is of course subject to the relevance of the variables used in 
the  first  stage.  I  rely  on  Gomes  and  Novaes’s  (2005)  theoretical  predictions,  but  other 
variables
14  could  maybe  have  a  stronger  explanatory  power.  This  section  dedicated  to 
endogeneity complements the results obtained with standard OLS regressions and tends to 
demonstrate that shareholder agreements are significantly associated with takeover premiums. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Using  a  sample  of  140  completed  acquisitions,  this  paper  investigates  the  impact  of 
shareholder agreements on takeover premiums. The main finding is that takeover premiums 
are significantly higher when some target shareholders are kept together by an agreement. 
This tends to validate the idea that such agreements enhance the negotiating power of target 
shareholders and force the bidder to pay a higher premium. These results are robust to the use 
of a Heckman two-step procedure which treats as endogenous the existence of an agreement.  
The  corporate  governance  of  firms  concerned  by  a  shareholder  agreement  is  also 
analyzed. Contrary to previous studies (Gianfrate, 2007), this paper does not point out any 
large wedge between ownership and control of shareholders’ coalitions.  
The paper hence argues for a positive view of shareholder agreements which appear as 
means of extracting higher rents from the bidder. Of particular interest is the fact that all 
shareholders  (even  those  that  are  not  signatories  to  the  agreement)  will  benefit  from  this 
higher premium.  
Belot (2008) and Roosenboom and Schramade (2006) document a positive association 
between shareholder agreements and firm value. This paper might explain this phenomenon: 
it  could  be  that  the  higher  anticipated  takeover  premium  explains  the  positive  effect  of 
shareholder agreements on firm value. 
Be that as it may, this paper highlights the value of devoting considerable attention to 
shareholder agreements. For example, further research should increase our knowledge of the 
effect  of  shareholder  agreements  on  takeover  likelihood.  It  is  often  postulated  that  such 
agreements  hamper  control  transactions  but  there  is  no  empirical  analysis  validating  this 
intuition.   
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Appendix A 
SELF TRADE: Ownership Structure and Board of Directors 
 
 
The asterix * denotes the shareholders who are signatories to an agreement. 
There are 2 large shareholders (the Wallenberg and Beigbeder families) who own respectively 
2.3% (SH1 CFR) and 17.4%. The ultimate voting rights are 18.4% (SH1 VR) and 17.4% 
respectively. 
The members of the agreements jointly own 63.4% of the voting rights (SHAG VR). As the 
agreement does not characterize concerted action, CONCERT VR=0. 
 
Board of Directors 
Name  Position  Affiliated to shareholder 
M. Appendino  Founder of Nestor  Nestor 
C. Beigbeder  -  Beigbeder Family 
J. Beck  -  - 
G. Breguet  Former Chairman of ABB and ASEA 
(controlled by the Wallenberg family) 
SEB 
R. Gavazzi  CEO of La Fondiaria Assicurazioni  La Fondiaria Assicurazioni 
F. James  Lawyer  - 
C. de Labriffe  Partner of Rothschild  Rothschild 
J. Maret  Associate of Oppenheim  Oppenheim 
L. Thunell  CEO of SEB  SEB 
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Table 1: Numbers of deals and prevalence of shareholder agreements 
The 140 observations of the sample are classified by years. Target Market Capitalization (Source: DATASTREAM) is 
equal to the target market value of equity (in million Euros) one month before the announcement of the deal. Shareholder 
Agreement is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if some target shareholders are signatories to an agreement and 
zero otherwise. 
 
    Target Market Capitalization  Shareholder Agreeement 
Year  n=  mean  median  sum  mean 
1999  12  1705.7  137.1  4  33.3% 
2000  23  719.7  195.3  7  30.4% 
2001  12  1083.0  634.1  3  25.0% 
2002  12  1534.5  218.4  4  33.3% 
2003  14  405.6  128.1  2  14.3% 
2004  12  4030.5  468.1  3  25.0% 
2005  25  1544.0  257.8  6  24.0% 
2006  13  246.5  78.1  2  15.4% 
2007  17  743.6  123.1  7  41.2% 








Table 2 : Ownership, deal characteristics and financial indicators 
WH10 takes a value of one if the firm does not have any large shareholder (i.e. owning at least 10% of the voting rights), ONE LARGE takes a value of one if there is only one large 
shareholder, COMPLEX is equal to one when the target ownership structure exhibits at least 2 large shareholders. SH1 CFR (VR) denotes the ultimate cash-flow (voting) rights (at the 20% 
threshold) of the largest shareholder, SH1 EXCESS is computed as ultimate voting rights over ultimate cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder. PREMIUM is calculated as (Offer Price / 
Price one month before the announcement)-1. TENDER takes a value of one when a tender offer is launched for the target, SAME INDUS takes a value of one if the bidder and the target have 
the same 2-digits SIC code, PRIVATE indicates whether the bidder is a private company, CASH takes a value of one if the bidder offers only cash, MULTIPLE takes a value of one if the bid 
has been contested, HOSTILE is equal to one if the bid is recorded by SDC as hostile. TOEHOLD is the percentage of target shares owned ex-ante by the bidder. MARKET CAP is the target 
market  value  of  equity  one  month  before  the  announcement  of  the  takeover,  LEVERAGE  is  calculated  as  total  financial  debt  over  total  assets  at  the  end  of  the  year  preceding  the 
announcement, M to B is the sum of the market capitalization (one month before the announcement) and financial debt divided by total assets (at the end of the fiscal year preceding the 
announcement). 
Student t-statistics test for the difference in means between the two categories. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 
 
    Whole Sample  No Agreement  With Agreement   
Difference in means      n=  140  n=  102  n=  38 
    mean  median  mean [a]  median [b]  mean [c]  median [d]  [a] - [c]  t-stat   
Ownership Characteristics                   
WH10    0.043  0.000  0.029  0.000  0.079  0.000  -0.050  -1.28   
ONE LARGE    0.471  0.000  0.598  1.000  0.132  0.000  0.466  5.37  *** 
COMPLEX    0.486  0.000  0.373  0.000  0.789  1.000  -0.417  -4.69  *** 
SH1 CFR    0.355  0.313  0.381  0.362  0.284  0.280  0.097  2.35  ** 
SH1 VR    0.446  0.402  0.473  0.484  0.374  0.332  0.099  2.34  ** 
SH1 VR – SH1 CFR    0.091  0.065  0.092  0.065  0.090  0.067  0.002  0.11   
SH1 EXCESS     1.693  1.163  1.732  1.146  1.589  1.261  0.143  0.33   
 
Deal Characteristics                   
PREMIUM    0.274  0.222  0.255  0.200  0.323  0.235  -0.067  -1.32   
TENDER    0.407  0.000  0.382  0.000  0.474  0.000  -0.091  -0.97   
SAME INDUS    0.371  0.000  0.333  0.000  0.474  0.000  -0.140  -1.53   
PRIVATE    0.564  1.000  0.618  1.000  0.421  0.000  0.197  2.10  ** 
CASH    0.814  1.000  0.863  1.000  0.684  1.000  0.179  2.45  ** 
MULTIPLE    0.029  0.000  0.029  0.000  0.026  0.000  0.003  0.10   
HOSTILE    0.014  0.000  0.020  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.020  0.87   
TOEHOLD    0.035  0.000  0.019  0.000  0.077  0.000  -0.057  -3.27  *** 
 
Financial Indicators                   
MARKET CAP    1263.733  200.635  954.641  148.380  2093.399  474.995  -1138.758  -1.50   
LEVERAGE    0.270  0.224  0.271  0.196  0.267  0.246  0.004  0.11   
M to B    1.506  1.115  1.580  1.108  1.308  1.138  0.272  0.80   
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Table 3: Shareholder agreements 
The whole sample contains 38 targets whose shareholders are signatories to an agreement. In Panel A, the sample is divided according to the type of the largest signatory (FAMILY/NOT 
FAMILY). In panel B, the sample is divided according to the existence of a concerted action provision (CONCERTED ACTION). In panel C, the sample is divided according to the existence 
of a provision which prescribes an allocation of board seats (BOARD PROVISION). LARGEST FAM indicates whether the largest signatory is a family, CONCERT indicates whether the 
agreement characterizes a concerted action, PREEMPTION takes a value of one if a clause that specifies pre-emptive buying rights is in force, BOARD indicates whether the agreement 
specifies an allocation of board seats. SIGNATORIES is the number of signatories, LARGEST CFR (VR) denotes the ultimate cash-flow rights (voting rights) of the largest signatory, SHAG 
CFR (VR) denotes the ultimate cash-flow rights (voting rights) of the coalition, SHAG MGT indicates whether a signatory to the agreement is also a member of the executive committee. 
LARGEST%BOARD denotes the percentage of board seats that is allocated to the largest signatory to the agreement, SHAG%BOARD denotes the percentage of board seats that is allocated 
to the members of the coalition. 
This table contains means for the above described variables. In each panel, Student t-statistics test for the difference in  means between the two categories.  Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 
    PANEL A      PANEL B      PANEL C   





SIGNATORY      CONCERTED 
ACTION      BOARD 
PROVISION 
   
  NOT 
FAMILY  FAMILY 
 
test for diff.  NO  YES 
 
test for diff.  NO  YES 
 
test for diff. 
  n=38  n=16  n=22  t-test      n=15  n=23  t-test      n=24  n=14     
LARGEST FAM  0.579  -  -  -      0.4  0.696  -1.84  *    0.542  0.643  -0.60   
CONCERT  0.605  0.438  0.727  -1.84  *    -  -  -      0.500  0.786  -1.76  * 
PREEMPTION  0.737  0.750  0.727  0.15      0.933  0.609  2.32  **    0.708  0.786  -0.51   
BOARD  0.368  0.313  0.409  -0.60      0.200  0.478  -1.76  *    -  -  -   
SIGNATORIES  3.289  3.188  3.364  -0.28      3.933  2.870  1.77  *    3.375  3.143  0.37   
LARGEST CFR  0.278  0.272  0.282  -0.19      0.285  0.273  0.22      0.291  0.256  0.60   
LARGEST VR  0.366  0.316  0.402  -1.38      0.359  0.370  -0.17      0.366  0.365  0.03   
SHAG CFR  0.461  0.444  0.473  -0.46      0.492  0.440  0.84      0.462  0.459  0.05   
SHAG VR  0.585  0.510  0.640  -2.04  **    0.589  0.583  0.10      0.575  0.603  -0.41   
SHAG MGT  0.632  0.375  0.818  -3.05  ***    0.733  0.565  1.04      0.625  0.643  -0.11   
                                  n=36  n=16  n=20        n=14  n=22        n=22  n=14     
LARGEST%BOARD  0.305  0.265  0.337  -1.24      0.261  0.333  -1.20      0.295  0.320  0.410   








Table 4: Corporate governance 
The whole sample contains 132 observations. The sample is divided according to the existence of a shareholder agreement. Firms which do not have at least one large shareholder (i.e. owning at least 
10% of the voting rights) are excluded from the subsample of firms that are not concerned by an agreement. BOARD SIZE denotes the number of board members. CEO/CH is equal to one when the 
CEO is also the chairman of the company. CFR denotes the ultimate cash-flow rights (at the 20% threshold) of the largest shareholder in subsample 1 whereas it denotes the cumulated ultimate cash-
flow rights of the signatories to the agreement in subsample 2. VR denotes the ultimate voting rights (at the 20% threshold) of the largest shareholder in subsample 1 whereas it denotes the cumulated 
ultimate voting rights of the signatories to the agreement in subsample 2. %BOARD denotes the percentage of board seats that is allocated to the largest shareholder in subsample 1 whereas it denotes 
the percentage of board seats that is allocated to the signatories to the agreement in subsample 2. MANAGEMENT takes a value of one when the largest shareholder participates in the management in 
subsample 1; it takes a value of one when one of the signatories to the agreement participates in the management in subsample 2. 
Student t-statistics and Wilcoxon z-statistics test for the difference in means and medians between the two categories. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, 
respectively. 
 





Test for differences in 
  n=132  n=96  n=36  means  medians 
  mean  median  mean  median  mean  median  t-stat    z-stat   
BOARD SIZE  7.864  7.000  7.240  7.000  9.528  9.000  -3.34  ***  -3.35  *** 
CUMUL  0.674  1.000  0.677  1.000  0.667  1.000  0.11    0.11   
MANAGEMENT  0.485  0.000  0.427  0.000  0.639  1.000  -2.19  **  -2.16  ** 
CFR  0.408  0.404  0.388  0.372  0.460  0.470  -1.69  *  -1.78  * 
VR  0.506  0.528  0.480  0.484  0.574  0.634  -2.24  **  -2.21  ** 
VR-CFR  0.098  0.080  0.092  0.068  0.115  0.106  -1.12    -1.39   
VR/CFR  1.666  1.170  1.791  1.154  1.331  1.252  1.10    -1.18   
%BOARD  0.468  0.444  0.435  0.400  0.555  0.563  -2.36  **  -2.64  *** 
%BOARD-CFR  0.060  0.044  0.047  0.011  0.096  0.088  -0.94    -1.49   
%BOARD/CFR  1.885  1.088  2.059  1.044  1.421  1.205  0.86    -1.63   
%BOARD-VR  -0.038  -0.063  -0.045  -0.083  -0.019  0.007  -0.56    -0.84   
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Table 5 : Shareholder agreements, ownership structures and takeover premiums 
This table presents regressions of takeover premiums on ownership variables and various control variables for the total sample. The dependent variable in all models is the takeover premium, 
computed as (Offer Price / Price one month before the announcement)-1. TENDER is a dummy variable which takes a value of one when a tender offer is launched for the target, SAME INDUS is 
a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the bidder and the target have the same 2-digits SIC code, PRIVATE is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the bidder is a private 
company, TOEHOLD is the percentage of target shares owned ex-ante by the bidder. LOG(MARKET CAP) is the logarithm of target market value of equity one month before the announcement 
of the takeover, LEVERAGE is calculated as total financial debt over total assets at the end of the year preceding the announcement, M to B is the sum of the market capitalization (one month 
before the announcement) and financial debt divided by total assets (at the end of the year preceding the announcement). AGREEMENT is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a 
shareholder agreement is in force, SH1 CFR denotes the ultimate cash-flow rights (at the 20% threshold) of the largest shareholder, SH1 SIGNATORY indicates whether the largest shareholder 
(owning at least 10% of the voting rights) is signatory to an agreement, SH1 EXCESS is computed as ultimate voting rights over ultimate cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder. SH1 EC 
AGREEMENT (CONCERT) is computed as the ratio of the voting rights owned by all the signatories to a shareholder agreement (concerted action) over the voting rights of the largest 
shareholder, it is set equal to 0 if there is no shareholder agreement (concerted action) in the target. 
All regressions are OLS regressions which include year dummies. n is the number of observations. Heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance 
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  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
TENDER  0.001    -0.003    0.004    -0.021    -0.028    -0.035   
  (0.01)    (-0.08)    (0.09)    (-0.50)    (-0.69)    (-0.79)   
SAME INDUS  0.139  ***  0.138  ***  0.136  ***  0.134  ***  0.135  **  0.144  *** 
  (2.70)    (2.70)    (2.66)    (2.67)    (2.60)    (2.83)   
PRIVATE  0.024    0.026    0.025    0.038    0.033    0.028   
  (0.57)    (0.60)    (0.59)    (0.90)    (0.80)    (0.69)   
TOEHOLD  -0.069    -0.072    -0.026    -0.051    -0.032    0.016   
  (-0.27)    (-0.27)    (-0.10)    (-0.19)    (-0.12)    (0.05)   
LEVERAGE  0.115    0.113    0.101    0.094    0.092    0.094   
  (0.72)    (0.73)    (0.65)    (0.63)    (0.61)    (0.63)   
LOG(MARKET CAP)  -0.045  **  -0.045  **  -0.045  **  -0.043  **  -0.040  **  -0.037  ** 
  (-2.42)    (-2.33)    (-2.34)    (-2.37)    (-2.22)    (-2.04)   
M to B  -0.019  ***  -0.019  ***  -0.019  ***  -0.020  ***  -0.021  ***  -0.021  *** 
  (-2.65)    (-2.72)    (-2.78)    (-2.93)    (-2.98)    (-3.04)   
AGREEMENT  0.093  **  0.092  *                 
  (1.99)    (1.88)                   
SH1 CFR      -0.022    -0.031    -0.117    -0.114    -0.128   
      (-0.20)    (-0.29)    (-0.84)    (-0.80)    (-0.91)   
SH1 SIGNATORY          0.099  **  0.094  *         
          (2.04)    (1.87)           
SH1 EXCESS              -0.018  *  -0.019  *  -0.019  * 
              (-1.80)    (-1.94)    (-1.88)   
SH1 EC 
AGREEMENT                  0.039       
                  (1.49)       
SH1 EC CONCERT                      0.003   
                      (0.10)   
Constant  0.353  ***  0.364  ***  0.370  ***  0.418  ***  0.418  ***  0.430  *** 
  (4.28)    (3.17)    (3.26)    (3.27)    (3.22)    (3.31)   
n =  140    140    140    140    140    140   
R²  0.305    0.305    0.307    0.324    0.316    0.306   
Adjusted R²  0.215    0.208    0.211    0.223    0.214    0.202   33 
 
Table 6: Agreements’ provisions and characteristics 
This table presents regressions of takeover premiums on ownership variables and various control variables for the total sample. The 
dependent variable in all models is the takeover premium, computed as (Offer Price / Price one month before the announcement)-1. 
TENDER is a dummy variable which takes a value of one when a tender offer is launched for the target, SAME INDUS is a dummy 
variable which takes a value of one if the bidder and the target have the same 2-digits SIC code, PRIVATE is a dummy variable 
which takes a value of one if the bidder is a private company, TOEHOLD is the percentage of target shares owned ex-ante by the 
bidder. LOG(MARKET CAP) is the logarithm of target market value of equity one month before the announcement of the takeover, 
LEVERAGE is calculated as total financial debt over total assets at the end of the year preceding the announcement, M to B is the 
sum of the market capitalization (one month before the announcement) and financial debt divided by total assets (at the end of the 
year preceding the announcement). PREEMPTION indicates whether a shareholder agreement is in force and specifies pre-emptive 
buying rights, BOARD indicates whether a shareholder agreement is in force and specifies an allocation of board seats, CONCERT 
indicates whether a shareholder agreement is in force and characterizes a concerted action. AGREEMENT is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if a shareholder agreement is in force, AG MGT takes a value of one if a signatory to the agreement participates 
in the management of the company, FAMILY is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the largest signatory to the 
agreement is a family. 
All regressions are OLS regressions which include year dummies. n is the number of observations. Heteroskedastic-consistent t-
statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
TENDER  0.002    0.001    -0.002    -0.005    -0.007   
  (0.05)    (0.01)    (-0.04)    (-0.10)    (-0.15)   
SAME INDUS  0.141  ***  0.151  ***  0.148  ***  0.133  **  0.138  *** 
  (2.73)    (2.89)    (2.85)    (2.58)    (2.69)   
PRIVATE  0.029    0.020    0.014    0.025    0.020   
  (0.64)    (0.50)    (0.34)    (0.59)    (0.47)   
TOEHOLD  -0.036    -0.014    0.029    -0.065    -0.076   
  (-0.14)    (-0.05)    (0.11)    (-0.25)    (-0.30)   
LEVERAGE  0.114    0.115    0.109    0.128    0.121   
  (0.71)    (0.73)    (0.68)    (0.81)    (0.77)   
LOG(MARKET CAP)  -0.044  **  -0.041  **  -0.040  **  -0.041  **  -0.040  ** 
  (-2.37)    (-2.22)    (-2.11)    (-2.10)    (-2.06)   
M to B  -0.018  **  -0.021  ***  -0.020  ***  -0.019  ***  -0.019  *** 
  (-2.63)    (-2.81)    (-2.78)    (-2.67)    (-2.66)   
PREEMPTION  0.099  *                 
  (1.70)                   
BOARD      0.121  *             
      (1.78)               
CONCERT          0.029           
          (0.61)           
AGREEMENT 
*AG MGT 
            0.124  **     
            (2.14)       
AGREEMENT 
*(1-AG MGT) 
            0.033       
            (0.66)       
AGREEMENT 
*FAMILY 
                0.131  ** 
                (2.15)   
AGREEMENT 
*(1-FAMILY) 
                0.031   
                (0.67)   
Constant  0.350  ***  0.357  ***  0.358  ***  0.330  ***  0.334  *** 
  (4.25)    (4.35)    (4.35)    (3.73)    (3.84)   
n =  140    140    140    140    140   
R²  0.303    0.303    0.288    0.311    0.313   
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Table 7: Treatment effect regressions 
This table presents treatment effect regressions (using Heckman’s two step consistent estimators) of takeover premium on ownership variables and various control variables for the total sample. The 
first stage model (probit estimation) includes variables which instrument for the existence of a shareholder agreement (and specific provisions), the second stage controls for the variables that are 
expected to impact the takeover premium and includes year dummies. Takeover premium is computed as (Offer Price / Price one month before the announcement)-1. LOG(MARKET CAP) is the 
logarithm of target market value of equity one month before the announcement of the takeover, LEVERAGE is calculated as total financial debt over total assets at the end of the year preceding the 
announcement, M to B is the sum of the market capitalization (one month before the announcement) and financial debt divided by total assets (at the end of the year preceding the announcement). 
VOLATILITY is the monthly calculated volatility of the target share price in the year preceding the announcement, R&D/ASSETS is computed as R&D expenditures over total assets (at the fiscal 
year end prior to the announcement), TA_LIQUIDITY is the liquidity of the market for corporate control for the target firm’s industry and is defined as the value of all corporate control transactions 
for $1 million or more reported by SDC for each year and two-digit SIC code divided by the total book value of assets of all THOMSON ONE BANKER firms in the same two-digit SIC code and year. 
HERFINDAHL is computed as the sum of the squared cash-flow rights of shareholders owning at least 5% of the cash flow rights, FAMILY indicates whether the largest shareholder of the target is a 
family. AGREEMENT is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a shareholder agreement is in force, CONCERT indicates whether the agreement characterizes a concerted action; BOARD 
indicates whether the agreement specifies an allocation of board seats. TENDER is a dummy variable which takes a value of one when a tender offer is launched for the target, SAME INDUS is a 
dummy variable which takes a value of one if the bidder and the target have the same 2-digits SIC code, PRIVATE is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the bidder is a private company, 
TOEHOLD is the percentage of target shares owned ex-ante by the bidder. 
n is the number of observations. z-statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Step 1  Step 2  Step 1  Step 2  Step 1  Step 2  Step 1  Step 2 
LEVERAGE  -0.296    0.186    -0.664    0.175    -1.040    0.110    -0.451    0.149   
  (-0.45)    (0.81)    (-0.86)    (1.11)    (-1.05)    (0.98)    (-0.54)    (1.18)   
LOG(MARKET CAP)  0.255  ***  -0.130  **  0.212  **  -0.071  ***  0.186  *  -0.037  **  0.223  **  -0.054  *** 
  (3.25)    (-2.00)    (2.48)    (-2.72)    (1.88)    (-2.09)    (2.27)    (-2.89)   
M to B  -0.208    0.030    -0.098    -0.012    -0.085    -0.023    -0.131    -0.016   
  (-1.31)    (0.54)    (-0.63)    (-0.39)    (-0.35)    (-1.02)    (-0.81)    (-0.65)   
VOLATILITY  -0.180        -0.901        -14.575  *      -1.235       
  (-0.08)        (-0.32)        (-1.87)        (-0.44)       
R&D/ASSETS  1.691        3.106        10.116  *      2.945       
  (0.59)        (1.00)        (1.74)        (0.92)       
TA_LIQUIDITY  2.444        4.932  *      1.602        3.815       
  (0.97)        (1.67)        (0.59)        (1.27)       
HERFINDAHL                          -1.557       
                          (-1.34)       
FAMILY                          0.602  *     
                          (1.82)       
AGREEMENT      1.131                           
      (1.60)                           
CONCERT              0.658  **              0.360  * 
              (1.96)                (1.77)   
BOARD                      0.068           35 
 
                      (0.22)           
TENDER      -0.004        -0.012        -0.015        -0.031   
      (-0.05)        (-0.22)        (-0.31)        (-0.62)   
SAME INDUS      0.136  *      0.148  ***      0.171  ***      0.155  *** 
      (1.93)        (2.89)        (3.68)        (3.34)   
PRIVATE      0.036        0.024        0.035        0.021   
      (0.53)        (0.48)        (0.77)        (0.46)   
TOEHOLD      -0.077        0.072        0.018        0.063   
      (-0.22)        (0.27)        (0.07)        (0.26)   
Constant  -1.830  ***  0.437  **  -2.025  ***  0.379  ***  -1.102    0.342  ***  -2.121  **  0.367  *** 
  (-3.11)    (2.12)    (-3.07)    (2.83)    (-1.17)    (3.30)    (-2.41)    (3.29)   
Selection Parameter λ      0.413        0.187  **      0.165        0.117  * 
      (-1.47)        (-1.96)        (0.26)        (-1.75)   
n=  129    129    129    129    129    129    129    129   
Pseudo R²  0.096        0.100        0.146        0.149       
Wald χ²      34.340   **      47.210  ***      57.160  ***      55.950  *** 
 
 
 
 